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Abstract
T he European Banking Union embarked as a highly ambitious project of the European Union as a response to the signifi cant fl aws and weaknesses in 
the original architecture of the European Monetary Union that became appar-
ent during the economic crisis. However, the establishment of a single European 
banking system has stumbled upon the creation of a common deposit insurance 
scheme that could safeguard depositors and create a more stable fi nancial frame-
work in the euro area.
The European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) was fi rstly introduced by 
the European Commission in 2015. As a bold proposal that comprises wide risk 
mutualization among the euro area member states, it has spurred a vivid discus-
sion in the European public speech and many proposals have been made since 
then altering its original planning in an effort to tackle the moral hazard con-
cerns that have risen. The present article, after discussing the reasons that keep 
obstructing EDIS, presents these suggestions that move around, primarily, the 
role of the national deposit guarantee schemes. However, as highlighted in the 
article, before moving to any alterations on the structure and role of a proposed 
common deposit insurance scheme, signifi cant risk minimization on behalf of the 
national banking systems, must precede by limiting the sovereign exposures of 
banks and the size of the Non-Performing Loans. Such steps of risk minimization 
are critical for addressing concerns and the political unwillingness demonstrated 
by several European countries in moving forward towards deeper integration. 
KEY-WORDS: European Banking Union, European Deposit Insurance Scheme, 
risk mutualization, moral hazard.
Η απουσία ενός Ευρωπαϊκού Συστήματος Ασφάλισης 
Καταθέσεων
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Περίληψη
Η Ευρωπαϊκή Τραπεζική Ένωση αποτελεί ένα από τα πλέον φιλόδοξα σχέδια ως απάντηση στις σημαντικές αδυναμίες στο οικοδόμημα της Ευρωπαϊκής Νομι-
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σματικής Ένωσης οι οποίες έγιναν προφανείς κατά την οικονομική κρίση. Ωστόσο, 
η εγκαθίδρυση ενός ενιαίου Ευρωπαϊκού τραπεζικού συστήματος δεν έχει ακόμα 
καταστεί δυνατή λόγω της έλλειψης ενός κοινού συστήματος προστασίας των κατα-
θέσεων. Ένα τέτοιο σύστημα θα ήταν ικανό να προσφέρει ασφάλεια στους καταθέτες 
και να δημιουργήσει ένα πιο σταθερό χρηματοοικονομικό πλαίσιο στην Ευρωζώνη. 
Το Ευρωπαϊκό Σύστημα Ασφάλισης Καταθέσεων (ΕΣΑΚ) προτάθηκε για πρώ-
τη φορά το 2015 από την Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή ως ένα σύστημα που περιλαμβάνει 
ευρύ διαμοιρασμό κινδύνου μεταξύ των κρατών μελών. Έκτοτε, έχουν κατατεθεί 
στον ευρωπαϊκό δημόσιο διάλογο, αρκετές αντιπροτάσεις που τροποποιούν τον αρ-
χικό σχεδιασμό σε μια προσπάθεια να αντιμετωπιστούν οι ανησυχίες περί «ηθι-
κού κινδύνου» που έχουν προκύψει. Το παρών άρθρο συζητά τους λόγους πάνω 
στους οποίους εδράζεται ο «ηθικός κίνδυνος» και αποτρέπουν την ολοκλήρωση του 
ΕΣΑΚ και παρουσιάζει τις εναλλακτικές προτάσεις οι οποίες αφορούν κυρίως το 
ρόλο των εθνικών αρχών ασφάλισης καταθέσεων. Ωστόσο, όπως υπογραμμίζεται 
στο άρθρο, είναι ζωτικής σημασίας να προηγηθεί της εγκαθίδρυσης οποιουδήποτε 
σχετικού συστήματος, σημαντική μείωση κινδύνου μέσω της ελάττωσης της έκθε-
σης των τραπεζών στα εγχώρια κρατικά χρέη και της μείωσης των Μη Εξυπηρετού-
μενων δανείων. Αυτό θα συμβάλλει σημαντικά στο να περιοριστούν οι φόβοι και 
οι πολιτικές ασυμφωνίες μεταξύ των ευρωπαϊκών κρατών σχετικά με τη βαθύτερη 
οικονομική ολοκλήρωση που επιχειρείται μετά την οικονομική κρίση.
ΛΕΞΕΙΣ-ΚΛΕΙΔΙΑ: Τραπεζική Ένωση, Ευρωπαϊκό Σύστημα Ασφάλισης Καταθέ-
σεων, αμοιβαιοποίηση κινδύνου, ηθικός κίνδυνος.
1. Introduction
T he European Union embarked on the highly ambitious plan of establishing a Banking Union back in 2012, when the severe economic crisis highlighted 
in the most apparent way the need for reforms in the original design of the Eu-
ropean Monetary Union. The introduction of such an institutional framework 
was intended to break the close fi nancial links between banks and their own 
sovereigns and promote the creation of a single banking market. However, after 
eight years, the European Banking Union is still not completed and neither of 
the stated objectives has been achieved. 
Despite the progress achieved so far -the creation and operation of the Sin-
gle Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and of the Single Resolution Mechanism 
(SRM)- the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), which is crucial for the 
effective operation of the Banking Union, is far from completed.
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A single deposit insurance scheme -meaning a common and uniform guaran-
tee for bank depositors across the monetary union- will provide a greater sense 
of security to depositors in the weaker economies of the Eurozone by disconnect-
ing banks from the national deposit insurance authorities that constitute today 
banks’ backstop. The relevant legislative proposal was published by the Euro-
pean Commission in 2015;1 EDIS is supposed to be completed in three stages 
by 2024: re-insurance, co-insurance and full direct insurance. The fi nal stage 
will consist of full risk mutualization where the losses and liquidity needs of 
the participating national deposit guarantee schemes will be fully covered by a 
European Deposit Fund (EDF) which will be based on banks’ risk-based contri-
butions. As expected, the bold proposal of a mechanism that comprises such wide 
risk sharing has triggered vivid debates in the European public discourse.
This short paper reviews the most prominent proposals that have been made 
towards the completion of EDIS. All of them seek to effectively address two ma-
jor obstacles: the doom loop and the moral hazard.
2. The “doom-loop” and the moral hazard issue
T he fi rst and most important goal not only of EDIS, but of the banking union as a whole, is to disconnect the banking sector from the public fi nances, 
breaking thus the so-called “doom-loop” that proved to be a major source of insta-
bilities. In the years prior to the crisis capital infl ows increased within the euro 
area, mostly due to the introduction of the common currency. This fueled large 
imbalances in some countries’ fi scal and current accounts making them suscep-
tible to crises. These imbalances were fi nanced by domestic banks, which ended 
up being the biggest holder of the public debt of their own governments, render-
ing thus the state the greatest debtor of many European banks. Counting in the 
fact that the task of bank supervision was entrusted to the national authorities, 
a vicious circle was created whereby the banking system and public fi nances 
were intertwined in a precarious way. Fears on the solvency of the former were 
translated in fears on the solvency of the latter and vice versa, making them both 
fragile. In this negative feedback process, sovereigns are responsible to bail-out 
their national banks, something that has a direct impact on the national debt 
level and an indirect impact on the yields of the sovereign bonds as their prices 
fall. In turn, this will lead to a deterioration of the banks’ balance sheets due to 
their high exposure to sovereign debt. The cases of Portugal, Spain, Ireland and 
Greece are indicative of the doom-loop’s detrimental results.2 Elevating main re-
sponsibilities of the banking sector, such as supervision and resolution, from the 
national to the central, supranational level, gives room to harmonized practices 
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within a so far fragmented system, where the weight for banks’ support during 
the crisis was mainly carried by European taxpayers.
Although banking supervision has now moved to the European level, which 
allows for the establishment of more sound practices regarding banks’ portfo-
lios, the national deposit insurance authorities still have a strong role as banks’ 
backstop and the ‘doom loop’ between banks and sovereigns still exists. This not 
only affects the quality of bank supervision but it also creates the conditions for 
contagion from the banking to the public sector. This strong link between banks 
and sovereigns was a key source of the instabilities that seriously aggravated 
the Eurozone debt crisis, since European banks remained exposed to the debt of 
their own governments instead of diversifying their sovereign exposures within 
a currency risk-free area. Despite the fact that this tendency seemed halt prior 
to 2008, during the crisis it was revived especially in countries with evident debt 
problems (Véron, 2017) that were also more likely to face fi nancing diffi culties. 
Today, and after the European leaders have repeatedly highlighted the impor-
tance of breaking this ‘doom-loop’, the vicious circle between banks and sover-
eigns seems to be still strong, although slowly declining from 2017. Looking at 
the EBA’s latest EU-wide transparency exercises, banks’ domestic sovereign ex-
posures stood at 46% in June 2018 a number that fell to 42% a year later. Almost 
40% of these exposures respond to 5-year maturity or more, raising thus the 
risk stemming from interest rate fl uctuations. It is evident that the “home-bias 
problem” is present, triggering fears about the resiliency of banks, especially in 
high-debt countries such as Italy. 
It is then no wonder that the EDIS has not proceeded yet. Member states 
with more robust economies and healthy bank sectors, are unwilling to share 
the same risk with more “fragile” countries that saw their banking sectors on 
the brink of collapse due to the sovereign crisis and sought external fi nancial 
assistance. Their unwillingness is rooted in concerns of moral hazard, and the 
perception that certain sovereigns will seek to ensure preferential funding from 
their domestic banks under a regime of supranational deposit security, which 
would facilitate the fi scal deviations observed in some countries before the crisis. 
One more critical point to address in regard to moral hazard are the Non-
Performing Loans (NPLs) that in the aftermath of the fi nancial crisis have be-
come a major concern for policymakers and supervisors. Although total NPLs 
have decreased by almost 50% since 2015, their volume still remains alarmingly 
high in some member states. As such, according to some, the process of “clean-
ing” banks’ balance sheets should be continued in order to achieve risk minimi-
zation before moving on to potential risk-sharing through the full participation 
in the EDIS mechanism. 
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3. Different proposals for an effective and moral hazard-
free deposit insurance system
T he diverging views on the structure and role of EDIS refl ect a much deep-er division among euro area members and mainly between Germany and 
France, as the two largest member states. The former, along with states such 
as Finland and the Netherlands, have showed unwillingness in promoting fur-
ther risk-mutualization based on the notion that most failings of the euro area 
stem from inadequate national fi scal policies that should be addressed with a 
stricter regulatory framework. On the other hand, France, and states mostly 
from the European periphery such as Italy, have over time called for deeper 
integration and stronger governance and accountability at the EU level. At-
tempting to reconcile these two positions has brought the completion of the 
banking union to a deadlock. 
However, this is a false dichotomy, which oversees the fact that both do-
mestic fi scal discipline by governments and risk sharing among the euro area 
member states of a monetary union should be complementary elements of the 
same architecture and not substitutive, since the lack of the one undermines the 
effectiveness of the other. 
In an effort to break this deadlock several proposals have been made on 
the way that EDIS development should be altered and proceed. An alternate 
regulatory regime has been proposed by Véron (2017) based on sovereign con-
centration charges. It is suggested that euro area banks’ sovereign exposures, 
weighted by coeffi cients (the concentration charges) should be included in banks’ 
risk-based capital ratio as a second component alongside with the total risk 
weighted-assets of each bank. The coeffi cients should increase accordingly to 
the exposure ratio, beginning from zero, with an “exemption threshold” stand-
ing at 33%. Such a scheme can give banks incentives to diversify their portfo-
lios, within the euro area, and limit their sovereign exposure in order to stay 
above the exemption threshold guaranteeing market discipline and balanced 
risk-sharing (Véron 2017).
Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2018) suggest keeping national compartments of 
EDIS under a single institutional framework as the fi rst ones to bear any poten-
tial losses since the sources of risk remain national. Insurance then should be 
unconditional and full for all member states, building up depositors’ trust to the 
system, a crucial element for the success of any deposit insurance system. This 
scheme of re-insurance by the national deposit guarantee authorities was also put 
forward by Gros (2015) as a long-run solution, funded by the Deposit Insurance 
Fund that is meant to be established according to the European Commission’s 
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proposal. In both proposals, authors suggest that the ESM should act as EDIS’ 
fi scal backstop as is the case for the SRM. On the contrary, Schnabel and Véron 
(2018) despite their suggestion that national deposit insurance schemes should 
remain functional, propose that they are phased out after a transition period and 
replaced by a European single-authority system, the Single Resolution Board. 
Any direct payouts to individuals would be made by the national authorities 
which will remain in place for implementation purposes. While Gros’ (2015) 
planning maintains autonomous decision making, entrusted to the national 
authorities, Schnabel and Véron (2018) argue that responsibility should be at a 
central level, where country-blind protection is guaranteed for all banks, in order 
to build depositors’ trust. 
In all three proposals deposit insurance fees for banks are differentiated in 
line with their risk exposure. Preserving national deposit guarantee schemes 
keeps a signifi cant degree of accountability at the national level easing thus fear 
about moral hazard under a full EDIS. Schoenmaker (2018) however, treats this 
arrangement as a potentially destabilizing factor of the national banking sys-
tems on the notion that during a recession, the surviving banks have to refi ll the 
national scheme through future contributions. As a result, the credit function 
of banks is compromised as well due to the credit crunch they experience. Ad-
dressing the justifi ed concerns on moral hazard by limiting banks’ exposure on 
sovereign debt will better create the proper circumstances within which deeper 
risk sharing can arise.
4. Future prospects of EDIS and the completion of the 
banking union
T he completion of EDIS remains a politically charged issue in the euro area. Keeping the national authorities involved and moving gradually towards a 
fully supranational deposit insurance guarantee mechanism could balance out 
the lack of political willingness due to moral hazard issues, but only temporarily 
as its effectiveness will be constantly under question. So far, the building of a 
more resilient European banking sector has stumbled upon the lack of political 
will and compromise grounded on different national interests on one hand and 
upon the fragility of national banking sectors and the fear of contagion on the 
other. At the same time, the fl aws in the original design of the monetary union 
and the poor effort to manage the debt crisis and deal with insolvent countries 
have spurred political controversies and have given rise to Eurosceptic and pop-
ulist parties in many member states. 
In this landscape of political fragmentation, consensus is a challenging task. 
This is evident even in the recent EU summits where budget negotiations did 
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not bear any results indicating the diffi culty of bridging all individual interests. 
The funding gap that the Brexit leaves constitutes a friction point as compro-
mise should be achieved between the member states that want to maintain the 
rebates on their contributions and the need to restrain spending in order to fi ll 
the Brexit gap. Once more it is laid bare that economic and monetary issues, 
especially those that require extensive consensus, are not free of political sensi-
tivities especially in the aftermath of a severe fi nancial crisis. 
The choice of Christine Lagarde as the new ECB president has also been 
discussed as a potential moving force towards deeper integration and the com-
pletion of the banking union. Her time as the Fund’s managing director dur-
ing times of economic turmoil equipped her with critical leadership skills and 
strong relationships with her German counterparts (Wolff and Christie 2019). 
As a result, and since the main obstacles that hold behind the wider reform 
agenda are of political nature, Lagarde can use this “space” provided to her to 
make a shift on economic policy and pursue the consent on the completion of the 
banking union. 
On the other hand, recent statements of the German Finance Minister Olaf 
Scholz have reignited the hopes that maybe a full European Banking Union is 
not far. In light of the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union, Scholz high-
lighted the importance of a complete banking union as a shield against external 
shocks alongside with the necessary risk sharing through a common European 
deposit insurance mechanism. Counting in the fact that the UK was the fi nancial 
centre of the EU, further integration among the Eurozone member states could 
enhance the Union’s international fi nancial role. However, Scholz noted as an 
indispensable precondition that in such a case all sovereign debt of the partici-
pating banks should be risk-free. Additionally, he proposed capital requirements 
for banks that buy euro area governments’ bonds, a suggestion that prompted 
Italy’s reaction as it would be harmful for the competitiveness of its banks. 
 German proposals mean that a wider context of reforms, regarding the 
banks’ balance sheets, should be established before Germany can agree to 
proceed to some form of risk sharing. As a result, and although the willingness 
to move forward has been expressed by the EU’s net contributor, it will not do so 
until specifi c and strict requirements have been met, and risk sharing is realised 
under its own conditions.
Notes
1. COM/2015/0586 fi nal- 2015/0270 (COD).
2. Portugal received in 2011 from the EU and the IMF fi nancial aid of up to €78 
billion for fi scal fi nancing needs and support to the banking system. Simi-
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larly, Spain in 2012 was provided fi nancial aid of up to €100 billion for the 
recapitalization of fi nancial institutions, while Ireland received a package of 
up to €35 billion for the support of the banking system. Greece had to recapi-
talize its banking system twice. In 2012 all four systemic banks received the 
total amount of €18 billion and in 2015 two of them received the total amount 
of €5.4 billion.
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